Peckham v. Idaho State Bd. Of Dentistry Appellant\u27s Brief Dckt. 39758 by unknown
UIdaho Law
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs
8-1-2012
Peckham v. Idaho State Bd. Of Dentistry
Appellant's Brief Dckt. 39758
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.
Recommended Citation
"Peckham v. Idaho State Bd. Of Dentistry Appellant's Brief Dckt. 39758" (2012). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 3921.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/3921
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
LON N. PECKHAM, D.M.D., a licensed ) 





IDAHO STATE BOARD OF ) 
DENTISTRY, and KEVIN T. STOCK, ) 
as Acting Board Chairman for the ) 
IDAHO STATE BOARD OF DENTISTRY,) 
) 
Respondents. ) 
Docket No. 39758-2012 
Case No.: CV-2011-00536 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
APPEALED FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN AND FOR BONNER COUNTY 
HONORABLE JEFF M. BRUDIE 
District Judge 
Brent C. Featherston, Esq. 
FEATHERSTON LAW FIRM, CHTD. 
113 South Second Avenue 
Sandpoint,ID 83864 
(208) 263-6866 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT 
Michael Kane, Esq. 
MICHAEL KANE & ASSOCIATES PLLC 
1087 W. River St. Ste. 100 
P.O. Box 2865 
Boise,ID 83701 
(208) 342-4545 
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS .......................................................................... . 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES .................................................. . 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................ '" ....................... . 




III. ARGUMENT................................................................................. 10 
IV. CONCLUSION.............................................................. ................. 33 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING.......................................................... 34 
TABLE OF CASES AND AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Becker v. Flaggers 
120 Idaho 521, 522, 817 P.2d 187,188 (1991); .............. . 
Berry v. Summers, 
76 Idaho 446, 451, 283 P.2d 1093,1095 (1955); ............ . 
Bogner v. State Dept. of Revenue & Taxation, State Tax Comm'n, 
107 Idaho 854, 859, 693 P.2d 1056, 1061 (1984); ........... . 
Chenoweth v. State board of Medical Examiners, 
57 Colo. 74,141 Pac. 132 (1913); .............................. . 
Escret v. Bonner County, 
139 Idaho 780, 784, 86 P.3d 494, 498, 
2004 WL 385028 (2004); .................................... . 
Higginson v. Westergard, 
100 Idaho 687, 692, 604 P.2d 51,56 (1979); ................ .. 
Howard v. Canyon County Board of Commissioners, 
128 Idaho 479, 480,915 P.2d 709,710 (1996); .............. . 
Krueger v. Board of Professional Discipline ofthe Idaho State 
Board of Medicine, 
122 Idaho 577, 580, 836 P.2d 523,526 (1992); .............. .. 
Laurino v. Board of Professional Discipline of the Idaho State 
Board of Medicine 
137 Idaho 596, 601-2, 51 P.3d 410,415-6 (2002); ........... . 
Love v. Board of county Commissioners of Bingham County, 
105 Idaho 558, 672 P.2d 471, Appeal after Remand, 
108 Idaho 728, 701 P .2d 1293 (1985); ........................ . 
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 
446 U.S. 238, 100 S.Ct. 1610,64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980); ...... 
Meyer v. Nebrask~ 















Petersen v. Franklin County, 
130 Idaho 176,938 P.2d 1214 (1996);.......................... 6,7 
Price v. Payette County bd. Of County Com'rs, 
113 Idaho 426, 429, 958 P.2d 583,586 (1998); ............... 17 
Shabinaw v. Brown, 
113 Idaho 747, 751, 963 P.2d 1184. 1188 (1998);.. ........... 19,21 
Sherwood v. Carter, 
119 Idaho 246, 256,805 P.2d 452,462 (1991);............... 18,19 
State v. Armstrong, 
38 Idaho 493, 225 Pac. 491 (1923);....................... ...... 10 
State v. Poe, 
139 Idaho 885, 88 P.3d 704 (2003); ............................ 28 
Tuma v. Board of Nursing, 
100 Idaho 74, 77, 593 P.2d 711,714 (1979); .................. 10 
Woodfield v. Board of Professional Discipline ofldaho State 
Board of Medicine, 
127 Idaho 738, 746-7, 905 P.2d 1047, 1055-6 (1995)........ 12,30 
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Counsel, 
425 U.S. 748,756-7,96 F.Ct. 1817,1823, 
48 L.Ed.2d 346, (1976).............. ....................... 27 
iii 
STATUTES 
Idaho Code § 12-117 ....................................................... . 
Idaho Code § 39-4304 ..................................................... . 
Idaho Code § 39-4305 ..................................................... . 
Idaho Code § 39-4306 ..................................................... . 
Idaho Code § 54-924(4) and (9) ......................................... . 
Idaho Code § 67-5279 ..................................................... . 
RULES 
LD.A.P.A. Rule 19.01.01.046 .................................... , ........ . 










I. ST ATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Amended Administrative Complaint filed by the Board of Dentistry ("BOD") against 
Lon Peckham, D.M.D. ("Peckham"), a licensed dentist contains four (4) allegations divided into 
two (2) distinct issues, the first concerning care to former patient, Ms. Malby, and the second 
allegations of false or misleading advertising. R. Vol. I, Pp. 19-271 
Counts III and IV of the Amended Administrative Complaint ("Advertising Matter") were 
amended at the outset of hearing on July 20th as a result of Dr. Peckham filing suit in the First 
Judicial District of the State ofIdaho entitled Lon N. Peckham, D.M.D. v. The Idaho State Board of 
Dentistry, Bonner County Case No. CV-2010-01306. Dr. Peckham sought and received by 
stipulation, a preliminary injunction from this Court prohibiting the BOD from proceeding on any 
allegations in the Complaint based upon I.D.A.P.A. Rule 19.01.01.046.02.(f) ("Rule 46) as 
unconstitutionally vague. The District Court issued an Amended Judgment in that proceeding 
determining Rule 46(f) to be constitutionally deficient? 
Hearings were held in Boise, Idaho on July 20 and 21, 2010, before the Hearing Officer 
selected by the BOD. On September 9, 2010, Hearing Officer issued Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order. R. Vol. I, Pp. 262-275. The Hearing Officer 
also found for the BOD regarding the allegations of Counts III and IV alleging that Dr. 
1 In accordance with IAR 35 (e), Appellant will refer to the Agency Record, submitted as a 
Clerk's Exhibit, as R. Vol. I and the Clerk's Record as R. Vol. II. 
2 The BOD has since amended its rule in 2011 striking the unconstitutional portion of Rule 46. 
Despite this, the District Court's Memorandum Opinion issued January 27,2012 relies on 
subsection (f) in affirming the BOD Order. R. Vol. II, P. 67. 
Peckham's website pages: "The Truth about Dentures" and "Can you Handle the Truth?", were 
advertising and contained "false, misleading or deceptive" statements. R. Vol. I, Pp.271-2 
The BOD issued a Final Order referencing, but not including, the Hearing Officer's 
Findings and Conclusions. R. Vol. II, Pp 329-332. The Final Order contains no deliberations or 
findings of fact or conclusion of law by the BOD. The Final Order references but does not attach 
or incorporate the Hearing Officer's recommended order. 
The Petition for Judicial Review was timely filed on March 29,2011. R. Vol. I, Pp. 337-
345. On appeal, the matter was reassigned to Second Judicial District, District Judge Jeff 
Brudie, who heard oral argument on December 7,2011 and issued his Memorandum Opinion on 
January 27, 2012. R. Vol. II, Pp. 59-69. 
Dr. Peckham filed a Notice of Appeal on March 8,2012. R. Vol. II, Pp. 70-3 
B. Statement of Facts 
1. Malby matter 
Counts I and II concern treatment of a former patient, Ms. Malby. The Hearing 
Officer found that Dr. Peckham misrepresented to her the procedure as a crown when it is "best 
described as an amalgam buildup and found that Dr. Peckham failed to "specifically inform" Ms. 
Malby that amalgam would be used to create the crown, concluding that "the patient did not give 
informed consent" and further concluding that Peckham's conduct failed to "meet the standard of 
dental care provided by other qualified dentists in the same community ... " and was therefore 
unprofessional conduct. R. Vol. I. Pp.267-271. No testimony was presented by the BOD 
establishing a professional standard of care in the community in regard to silver amalgam crowns 
and informed consent. 
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Ms. Malby never testified to being misled as to the nature of the crown provided to her. 
Rather, Ms. Malby testified to an extensive history of crown work going back many years. (Tr. Vol. 
I, p.53, 11.1-10)3. Dr. Peckham replaced other crowns on other teeth for Ms. Malby prior to the 
work performed on tooth 18. It was Ms. Malby's choice alone to have Dr. Peckham place a silver 
crown or a silver amalgam crown on tooth 18 and she did not recall anyone using specific terms 
"silver crown" or "silver amalgam crown". (Tr. Vol. I, p.68, 11. 10-17; p.22, 11.3-20; pp.55-56) In 
fact, Ms. Malby testified that she suggested a cheaper alternative for tooth 18 because it was not 
visible, and she testified that she was familiar with the silver crown procedure and she knew it 
would be less visually appealing than a porcelain crown. (Tr. Vol. I, p.52, 11. 2-21). This was Ms. 
Malbv's testimony of her discussion with Dr. Peckham to the extent she could recall anything said 
in 2007. Dr. Peckham's testimony was specific and clear as to the disclosure and description of the 
Silver Amalgam Cro\vTI procedure given to Ms. Malby. 
Since Ms. Malby's own testimony is that she does not recall whether the tenn "silver 
crown" was used, the Finding that she was misled by the terms used by Dr. Peckham is unsupported 
by her own testimony. (Tr. Vol. I, Pp52-4) 
The BOD and Hearing Officer suggest that Malby was misled by the terminology "silver 
crown" versus "silver amalgam crown". There is no distinction between a silver crown or a silver 
amalgam, and no expert testified to such a distinction. Dr. Darrel Mooney, a prosthodontist and 
general dentist, holding advanced board certification in fixed prosthodontics, which involves an 
additional three years of training beyond general dentistry in the field of crowns, bridges and 
3 Transcripts will be referred to as Tr. VoU (Hearing July 20,2010), Tr. Vol. II (Hearing July 
3 
implants, testified the terms are interchangeable and mean the same thing. (Tr. Vol. II, pp.264, 226-
7) 
Dr. Mooney and the literature define a crO\Vil as anything that replaces the form, function, 
contacts and occlusal contacts of an existing restoration or an existing crown. (Tr. Vol. II, pp.266-
7). By contrast, Dr. Blaisdell, a member of the BOD who participated in the vote to investigate and 
prosecute Dr. Peckham in this matter, testified as the BOD's expert. (Tr. Vol. I, Pp. 105) He is a 
general dentist and testified that from his experience crowns are defined by their indirect placement 
procedure. He was unfamiliar with the Silver Amalgam Cro\vTI, except from a class he attended 
many years ago. (Tr. Vol. I, Pp. 90-94) 
Finally, the only and unrebutted testimony of Dr. Mooney established that the terminology 
"silver crown" or "silver amalgam crown" is interchangeable and refers to the direct placement 
procedure of constructing the crown within the patient's mouth, rather than casting and fabricating a 
crown for subsequent placement in the patient's mouth. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 276,11.18-19). 
Finally, Dr. Peckham testified clearly that his procedure with Ms. Malby, as with others, is 
always to explain the silver amalgam crown as a single appointment procedure and cheaper because 
it does not incur lab or other costs. Tr. Vol. II, P. 373, 1.12 -P.374, 1. 25. Dr. Peckham testified this 
discussion with Malby occurred on January 5, 2001 while removing sutures from a December 
procedure to build up (denoted in chart as "BU") tooth 18 for the original treatment plan of a 
porcelain fused to gold cro\vTI (denoted in chart as "PFO"), that was then changed to a full gold 
(denoted in chart as "FOC"). After hearing Dr. Peckham's disclosures, Ms Malby directed Dr. 
Peckham to provide her with an Amalgam Silver Crown ("AgC"). Tr. Vol. II, Pp. 372-375; R. Vol. 
21,2010), and Tr. Vol. III, (Appeal Hearing, December 7,2011). 
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I, Pp. 106-109, 127 [Po 127 reflects the earlier choices by Ms. Malby of "PFG" and "FGC" as 
crossed out in the chart in favor of "AgC". 
On appeal to the District Court, Dr. Peckham challenged the evidence supporting the BOD's 
Final Order in regard to the Malby matter. Specifically, Peckham challenged the Hearing Officer's 
Conclusions of Law that Dr. Peckham: 
... failed to advise his patient... in understandable terms ... the treatment he actually 
rendered by providing a large amalgam buildup rather than a silver crown. This 
conduct failed to meet the standard of dental care provided by other qualified 
dentists in the community or similar communities, taking into account the training, 
experience and degree of expertise to which Dr Peckham holds himself out to the 
public. His conduct was unprofessional as defined by Board rules ... failure to 
advise a patient in understandable terms of the treatment to be rendered and 
alternatives. Such conduct constituted violations of IDAPA Rule 19.01.01.040.21 
and Idaho Code §54-924 (7), (8), and (12)." 
R. VoL I, P. 271 
The District Court's Memorandum Opinion affirmed the BOD without discussion or 
consideration of Dr. Peckham's challenges on appeal. 
1. Advertising matter 
Count III of the Amended Administrative Complaint alleges Dr. Peckham violated Idaho 
Code § 54-924(4) and (9) and LD.A.P.A. Rule 19.01.01.046.02.f. (rule 46) by "advertising" on his 
website in a segment entitled "The Truth About Dentures". R. Vol. I, Pp. 23-4. 
Count IV alleges that the portion of Dr. Peckham's website entitled "Can You Handle the 
Truth? The State Dental Board Doesn't Think You Can!" violates Idaho Code § 54-924(4) and (9) 
and LD.A.P.A. Rule 19.01.01.046.02 (a) and (f) by containing advertising statements and that such 
that are false, misleading and/or deceptive, or were not readily susceptible to verification and may 
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contain representations that were "intended to take advantage of the fears or emotions of a 
particularly susceptible type of patient." R. Vol. I, Pp. 24-5. 
At hearing, the BOD through counsel, moved to strike the portions of Count III and IV 
that alleged a violation of subsection (f) of Rule 46, in compliance with the a District Court 
Preliminary Injunction in First Judicial District of the State of Idaho entitled Lon N. Peckham, 
D.M.D. v. The Idaho State Board of Dentistry, Bonner County Case No. CV-2010-01306. 
Ultimately, the District Court4 entered a Final Judgment in that matter determining subsection (f) 
to be unconstitutional. Inexplicably, the District Court in its Memorandum Opinion and Order 
on Petition for Judicial Review entered January 27, 2012, relied upon and cited subsection (f) of 
Rule 46 as a basis for affirming the Board of Dentistry and the Hearing Officer's Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order. 
The Memorandum Opinion made no discussion of the arguments raised by Dr. Peckham 
on appeal in regard to the advertising matters. 
C. Standard of Review 
When reviewing an agency's decision, the Appellate Court reviews the agency decision 
independent of the District Court's decision or review on appeal. Howard v. Canyon County 
Board of Commissioners, 128 Idaho 479, 480, 915 P.2d 709, 710 (1996); Petersen v. Franklin 
County, 130 Idaho 176,938 P.2d 1214 (1996). 
The Appellate Court" ..... may reverse or modifY if substantial rights of the parties have 
been prejudiced by administrative findings which violate constitutional or statutory provisions, 
4 Although both this Petition for Review and the case challenge section (f) were originally 
assigned to District Judge, Steve Verby, the Petition for Review was reassigned to Judge Brudie 
just prior to oral argument. 
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are III excess of authority, are made upon unlawful procedure, or are clearly erroneous or 
arbitrary and capricious." Petersen v. Franklin County, 130 Idaho 176, 182,938 P.2d 1214, 1220 
(1996). 
Factual determinations are not erroneous when they are supported by competent and 
substantial evidence, even though conflicting evidence exists. Erroneous conclusions of law 
made by an agency may be corrected on appeal." I4.;. citing Love v. Board of County 
Commissioners of Bingham County, 105 Idaho 558, 671 P.2d 471, Appeal after Remand, 108 
Idaho 728, 701 P.2d 1293 (1985). 
Idaho Code § 67-5279 governs the review of administrative agency decisions. The statute 
provides guidance in review of administration decisions as follows: 
1. The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the 
agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. 
3. When the agency was required ... to issue an order, the 
court shall affirm the agency action unless the court finds that the 
agency's findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory 
proVISlOns; 
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
(c) made upon unlawful procedures; 
(d) not supported by substantial evidence on the record 
as a whole; or, 
(e) arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. 
If the agency action is not affirmed, it shall be set aside in whole 
or in part, and remanded for further proceedings as necessary. 
Idaho Code § 67-5279 (2011) 
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II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Were Dr. Peckham's constitutional and due process rights violated by the 
BOD's Findings of Fact and a Conclusion of Law in the Malby Matter? 
1. The Hearing Officer erred in his Findings of Fact. 
a. Ms. Malby "believed" that she had been provided a 
crown similar in structure as the other crowns she had 
received, but made with a "silver" metal, rather than the 
more expensive gold or porcelain/gold. 
b. That Dr. Peckham's use of the term "silver amalgam" 
versus "silver crown" somehow lends credence to Ms. 
Malby's accusation she was misled. 
c. The "amalgam" crown dates back more than 30 years, 
but is not routine or common practice in the Post Falls, 
Idaho area. 
d. Amalgam is not as strong as porcelain or gold, has no 
insurance billing code, and is best described as an 
amalgam buildup, not a crown. 
e. It can reasonably be concluded that unless a patient is 
specifically informed that amalgam will be used to create 
a direct placement crown, the patient did not give 
informed consent. 
f. The five (5) findings above are unsupported by 
substantial evidence and constitute an arbitrary and 
capricious exercise of discretion by the Hearing Officer 
resulting in an unconstitutional Conclusion of Law about 
the medical standard of care. 
2. The Hearing Officer erred in his Conclusion of Law that Dr. 
Peckham failed to meet the Standard of Care. 
B. The Hearing Officer's finding that Dr. Peckham engaged in advertising which 
was false, misleading or deceptive to the public is unsupported by the Record 
and constitutes a violation of Dr. Peckham's due process and constitutional 
rights. 
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1. Missing Teeth v. Dentures 
2. Dr. Peckham did not make any false or misleading statement on 
his website regarding the State Dental Board. 
C. Dr. Peckham's web sites are speech entitled to constitutional protection. 
1. Dr. Peckham's statements on the website are not advertising. 
D. The Board of Dentistry's Final Order is Deficient and must be overturned. 
E. The BOC's Final Order as to the Malby matter is improper as they rely upon 
the "expert" testimony from one of the BOD's Board Members, Dr. Blaisdell. 
F. Dr. Peckham is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs. 
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III. ARGUMENT 
A. Were Dr. Peckham's constitutional and due process rights violated by the 
BOD's Findings of Fact and a Conclusion of Law in the Malby Matter? 
"The right to follow a recognized and useful occupation is a right protected by the 
constitutional guaranty of liberty." Berry v. Summers. 76 Idaho 446, 451, 283 P.2d 1093, 1095 
(1955); citing 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States; Article I, Sections 1 and 13 
of the Constitution of the State of Idaho, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 623, 67 L.Ed. 
1042 (1995); Chenoweth v. State Board of Medical Examiners,57 Colo. 74,141 Pac. 132 (1913); 
and State v. Armstrong, 38 Idaho 493,225 Pac. 491 (1923) 
The Idaho Supreme Court has previously recognized that the right to "practice one's 
profession is a valuable property right and that a state cannot exclude a person from the practice of 
his profession without having provided the safe guards of due process". Krueger v. Board of 
Professional Discipline of the Idaho State Board of Medicine, 122 Idaho 577, 580, 836 P.2d 523, 
526 (1992); citing Tuma v. Board of Nursing, 100 Idaho 74, 77, 593 P.2d 711,714 (1979). 
Since the Board of Dentistry did not deliberate or otherwise issue findings and conclusions, 
their brief Final Order lacks any indication of how, and by what means, they determined to adopt 
the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.5 
1. The Hearing Officer erred in his Findings of Fact. 
The Hearing Officer made several erroneous or unsupported Findings which led to his final 
conclusion of law that Dr. Peckham failed to meet the "standard of dental care provided by other 
qualified dentists in the same community or similar communities .... " R. Vol. 1. P. 271. Although 
5 As discussed below, the BOD's Final Order is deficient because it did not incorporate the 
Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order. 
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that Conclusion of Law is erroneous and unsupported by the record, of itself, there were a number 
of erroneous and unsupported factual findings that lead up to that conclusion, as follows: 
a. Ms. Malby "believed" that she had been provided a crown 
similar in structure as the other crowns she had received, but made 
with a "silver" metal, rather than the more expensive gold or 
porcelain/gold. 
b. That Dr. Peckham's use of the term "silver amalgam" 
versus "silver crown" somehow lends credence to Ms. Malby's 
accusation she was misled. 
c. The "amalgam" Cro\Vll dates back more than 30 years, but 
is not routine or common practice in the Post Falls, Idaho area. 
d. Amalgam is not as strong as porcelain or gold, has no 
insurance billing code, and is best described as an amalgam 
buildup, not a crown. 
e. It can reasonably be concluded that unless a patient is 
specifically informed that amalgam will be used to create a direct 
placement crown, the patient did not give informed consent. 
f. This conduct failed to meet the standard of dental care 
provided by other qualified dentists in the same community or 
similar communities, taking into account the training, experience 
and degree of expertise to which Dr. Peckham holds himself out to 
the public. His conduct was unprofessional as defined by Board 
rules, .... failure to advise patients in understandable terms of the 
treatment to be rendered and alternatives. 
R. Vol.L, Pp. 264-7; P. 271. 
Appellant will address each of the Hearing Officer's findings (a) through (e) as not 
supported by the testimony and evidence leading to the ultimately erroneous Conclusion of Law 
itemized as number (f) above. 
a. Ms. Malby "believed" that she had been provided a crown 
similar in structure as the other crowns she had received, but 
made with a "silver" metal, rather than the more expensive gold 
or porcelain/gold. 
Ms. Malby had extensive knowledge of crown procedures and never testified that she was 
misled as to the nature of the Silver crown. Tr. Vol. I, p.53, 11.1-10 Dr. Peckham placed crowns on 
11 
other teeth for Ms. Malby prior to the Silver crown on tooth 18. Ms. Malby suggested to Dr. 
Peckham a less expensive crown because tooth 18 was not visible, and she testified that she was 
familiar with the silver crown procedure and she knew it would be less visually appealing than a 
porcelain crown. Tr. Vol. I, p.52, 11. 2-21 ;Tr. Vol. I, p.68, 11. 10-17; p.22, 11.3-20; pp.55-56) In fact, 
Ms. Malby testified that she suggested a cheaper alternative for tooth 18. This was Ms. Malby's 
testimony of her discussion with Dr. Peckham to the extent she could recall any of it. Dr. 
Peckham's testified he explained to her the procedure uses material similar to a filling and is a 
single appointment procedure. Tr. Vol. II, P. 373,1.12 -P.374, 1. 25 
Since Ms. Malby's O\vn testimony is that she does not recall whether the term "silver 
crown" was used, the Finding that she was misled by the terms used by Dr. Peckham is unsupported 
by her own testimony. (Tr. Vol. I, Pp52-4) 
"In determining whether there was substantial evidence to support the district court, this 
Court must give due regard to the special opportunity of the trial court, acting as the fact finder, 
to judge the credibility of those witnesses." Higginson v. Westergard, 100 Idaho 687, 692, 604 
P.2d 51,56 (1979) 
In this matter, Ms. Malby testified by telephone on July 20, 2010, leaving the Hearing 
Officer no opportunity to observe her demeanor or evaluate her credibility on the stand, except 
through her verbal statements. "Generally speaking, findings based on witness credibility 
depend critically on observation of the witness." Woodfield v. Bd. of Profl Discipline of Idaho 
State Bd. of Me d., 127 Idaho 738, 746, 905 P.2d 1047, 1055, (Ct. App. 1995) 
The Hearing Officer and BOD made no record of why they disregarded Dr. Peckham's 
testimony that conflicts with Ms. Malby's account about the crown procedure and materials used, 
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especially in light of Ms. Malby' lack of memory regarding the discussion. Ms. Malby testified 
nearly a dozen times that she could not recall or remember her conversations with Dr. Peckham 
regarding the crown procedures. Tr. Vol. I, Pp. 18,11.4-5; 22, 11.14-20; 23, 115-10; 49, 11,1-4;54.11. 
5-24. Additionally, Ms. Malby testified at hearing inconsistent with, and was impeached by, her 
prior deposition testimony. Tr. Vol. I, Pp.55-6; 57, 1113-25. 
b. That Dr. Peckham's use of the term "silver amalgam" versus 
"silver crown" somehow lends credence to Ms. Malby's 
accusation she was misled. 
On this point, the Hearing Officer again badly misconstrues the testimony, inferring that Ms. 
Malby must have been misled because she thought she was getting a "silver crown" when she 
actually received a "silver amalgam crown". Nothing in the testimony defined a crown by the 
substance or material used, not even the BOD's expert witness. 
Additionally, the undisputed testimony established there is no distinction between a silver 
crown or a silver amalgam. Dr. Darrel Mooney, a prosthodontist and general dentist, holding 
advanced board certification in fixed prosthodontics, which involves an additional three years of 
training beyond general dentistry in the field of crowns, bridges and implants, testified the terms are 
interchangeable and mean the same thing. (Tr. Vol. II, pp.264, 226-7) 
Dr. Mooney defined a crown as anything that replaces the form, function, and occlusal 
contacts of the tooth. (Tr. Vol. II, pp.266-7). By contrast, Dr. Blaisdell, a board member of the 
BOD who participated in the vote to investigate and prosecute Dr Peckham in this matter, testified 
as the BOD's expert. (Tr. Vol. I, Pp. 105) He is a general dentist and testified that he was unfamiliar 
with the Silver Crown, except from a class he attended many years ago. (Tr. Vol. I, Pp. 90-94) 
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In short, even if Ms. Malby thought a "silver crown" was different than a "silver amalgam 
crown" based on her prior experience, that belief was purely subjective to Ms. Malby and 
unsupported by fact or evidence. Dr Mooney and Dr. Peckham both testified that no dental product 
is "pure" silver and all are some mix or amalgam product. Tr. Vol. II, p. 276, 11.18-19; Pp. 369, 
383,1. 21-385, 1.5. 
The Hearing Officer's Findings that a distinction exists between the terminology silver 
amalgam and silver crown are unsupported by the record. 
c. The "amalgam" crown dates back more than 30 years, but is not 
routine or common practice in the Post Falls, Idaho area. 
This finding by the Hearing Officer is wholly unsubstantiated by the record. There was no 
testimony as to the standard of practice in Idaho or the Post Falls, Idaho area. Even the BOD's 
expert witness, Dr. Bates testified that amalgam crowns are used. Tr. Vol. I, P. 155,11.2-4. 
Dr. Mooney actually testified that as recently as ten (10) to fifteen (15) years ago, he and his 
partners stopped using amalgam crowns for two reasons: one, there was public misperception about 
the safety of mercury sometimes found in the amalgam even though ADA determined it safe; and, 
two, (and most significant in his testimony) the amount of dentist time and skill required by silver 
amalgam crowns makes it unprofitable, compared to other crowns (gold and/or porcelain) that are 
purchased from a lab and simply installed by the dentist at more than twice the price. (Tr. Vol. II, 
pp.283-284). Dr. Mooney testified that it is not surprising that many general dentists may not 
recognize a silver amalgam crown because they are used infrequently for these reasons. (Tr. Vol. II, 
pp.336, 11.13-21). 
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Dr. Mooney further testified that though he is not familiar with whether other dental 
practices were using amalgam crowns, it is an acceptable procedure and properly described as a 
"crown". (Tr. Vol. II, p.336, 11.22- p.337, lA.). 
Even Dr. Blaisdell admitted his own inexperience with the tenninology in direct 
examination stating that he was unfamiliar with the tenn "silver crown" or "silver amalgam crown". 
(Tr. Vol. I, p. 96, 11.11-16).6 
For the reasons set forth above, the Hearing Officer and, thus, the Board of Dentistry'S 
findings that amalgam crowns are not routine or common practice and are an unusual procedure, are 
unsubstantiated by the record. 
d. Amalgam is not as strong as porcelain or gold, has no insurance 
billing code, and is best described as an amalgam buildup, not a 
crown. 
Both Drs. Blaisdell and Mooney note that insurance billing codes often do not exist to 
adequately describe appropriate and accepted dental procedures in the state of Idaho, and the doctor 
must use a "99" or catchall code with an attached explanation. (Tr. Vol. I, P. 122,11. 1-23; Vol. II, 
Pp.309-310) 
Although it is undisputed that amalgam products do not have the same "crush strength" as 
gold or porcelain fused to gold, Dr. Mooney's testimony established that the analogy of crush 
strength using a set of pliers is not an appropriate comparison to the forces within the mouth. He 
further testified that crushing gold or porcelain with pliers would also result in failure. (Tr. Vol. II, 
p.287, 1. 14-p.288, 1.10). 
6 Dr. Blaisdell is a member of the Board of Dentistry and voted to investigate the complaint 
against Dr. Peckham. Despite this obvious conflict of interest and the imputed bias, Dr. Blaisdell 
was the sole and only "expert" called by the Respondent, Board of Dentistry. 
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On this point, Dr. Mooney's undisputed testimony established that amalgam crowns last an 
average of over 14 years and when they fail, it is due to recurrent tooth decay and, therefore, it is the 
tooth that fails rather than the crown itself. (Tr. Vol. II, p.288, 1.12-p.289, 1.10). This is exactly 
consistent with the events of Ms. Malby's failed crown, which fell off and recurrent tooth decay was 
discovered on the tooth. (Complainants' Exhibits 3 and 4). 
Dr. Mooney clearly distinguished the definition of a cro\\n from that of an amalgam buildup 
by testifYing that a crown must replace the form, function and occlusal contacts of the original 
tooth, while a buildup is simply a shapeless foundation upon which a crown is placed. (Tr. Vol. II, 
p.266, 1.21-267, 1.7; p.273, 11.2-23; p.276, 11.5-19; p.280, 1.24-p.281, 1.15). The Hearing officer 
apparently did not understand the technical testimony when he concluded that Ms. Malby was 
provided a buildup, despite the testimony from Ms. Malby, Dr. Blaisdell, Dr. Mooney and Dr. 
Prosser (through his chart notes and interviews) all observed that Dr. Peckham placed a "beautifully 
formed" silver crown that "perfectly" replaced the anatomy and contours of Tooth 18. (Tr. Vol. II, 
P. 313-4) Dr. Mooney opined that crowns are anything that replaces the "form, function, contacts 
and occlusion of the natural crown of the tooth". (Tr. Vol. I, P. 273) 
The Hearing officer's findings reflect his inability to understand the testimony presented at 
hearing. 
e. It can reasonably be concluded that unless a patient is 
specifically informed that amalgam will be used to create a direct 
placement crown, the patient did not give informed consent. 
On this point, the Hearing Officer simply ran amuck. The Hearing Officer chose to insert 
his own "standard" of care without any reference to case law, rule, regulation and, most 
importantly, without a basis in the evidence or testimony at hearing. There was no testimony 
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presented by the BOD as to the standard of care in Post Falls, Idaho regarding informed consent for 
the Silver Amalgam crown procedure. The Hearing Officer subjectively creates (coaching it as 
"reasonable concluded") his O\vn standard of care that a dentist must be "specifically informed that 
amalgam will be used" and concluding that Dr. Peckham acted unprofessionally by failing to do so, 
a breach of the "standard of dental care provided by other qualified dentists in the same 
community ... ". R. Vol. I, Pp. 267,271. 
f. The five (5) findings above are unsupported by substantial 
evidence and constitute an arbitrary and capricious exercise of 
discretion by the Hearing Officer resulting in an 
unconstitutional Conclusion of Law about the medical standard 
of care. 
"The Board's zoning decision may only be overturned where its findings: (a) violate 
statutory or constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory authority; (c) are made 
upon unlawful procedure; (d) are not supported by substantial evidence in the record; or (e) are 
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." Price v. Pavette County Bd. of County Com'rs, 
131 Idaho 426, 429, 958 P.2d 583, 586, (1998) [reversing and remanding where evidence was 
did not substantially support findings] 
"T 0 be substantial, the Commission must have "more than a scintilla" of evidence 
supporting its conclusions." Becker v. Flaggers, 120 Idaho 521, 522, 817 P.2d 187, 188, (1991) 
Dr. Peckham testified clearly that his procedure with Ms. Malby, as with others, is always 
to explain the silver amalgam crown as a single appointment procedure and is cheaper because it 
does not incur lab or other outside costs. Dr. Peckham explained to Ms. Malby (as with all of his 
patients) that the amalgam croV'vn looks much like a filling and is, therefore, less aesthetically 
pleasing. Ms. Malby testified repeatedly she could not recall any specifics of what was said to 
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her during the appointments in January and February of 2007. The Hearing Officer made no 
attempt to reconcile or even discuss the discrepancies or credibility of her testimony or Dr. 
Peckham's testimony. There was no substantial evidence to support the Findings of Fact set 
forth above and the Court must reverse and remand with instructions. 
The Hearing Officer accepted the "subjective" beliefs of Ms. Malby in his Findings, a 
standard rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court. "I.C. § 39-4304 sets forth and requires an 
objective, medical-community standard for determining whether a patient has been adequately 
informed prior to giving consent for medical treatment." Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246, 
256, 805 P .2d 452, 462, (1991). 
The Board of Dentistry presented no testimony or evidence of an objective standard of care. 
While Dr. Mooney and Dr. Peckham testified that Dr. Peckham's advisement to Ms. Malby met the 
standard of care regarding informed consent. 
These Findings of Fact are in error and unsupported by the Record. Further, the Finding of 
Fact by the Hearing Officer, and apparently adopted by the Board of Dentistry, led the Hearing 
Officer to Conclusions of Law that violate Dr. Peckham's constitutional guaranties and right to due 
process since no standard (or an illusory standard) was created and applied by the Hearing Officer. 
2. The Hearing Officer erred in his Conclusion of Law that Dr. Peckham 
failed to meet the Standard of Care 
As noted above, the erroneous findings of fact formed the foundation for the Hearing 
Officer's erroneous Conclusion of Law. 
This conduct failed to meet the standard of dental care provided by 
other qualified dentists in the same community or similar 
communities, taking into account the training, experience and 
degree of expertise to which Dr. Peckham holds himself out to the 
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public. His conduct was unprofessional as defined by Board rules, 
.... failure to advise patients in understandable terms of the 
treatment to be rendered and alternatives. 
R. Vol.l., P. 271. 
Again, these findings are wholly unsubstantiated by the record and constitute an arbitrary 
and capricious abuse of discretion by the Hearing Officer and BOD. 
"Section 39-4305 of the Idaho Code provides that a written consent, in the absence of 
convincing proof that it was secured maliciously or by fraud, is presumed to be valid for the 
furnishing of such care, treatment or procedures, and the advice and disclosures of the attending 
physician or dentist, as well as the level of informed awareness of the giver of such consent, shall 
be presumed sufficient. Shabinaw v. Brown, 131 Idaho 747, 751, 963 P.2d 1184, 1188, (1998) 
[underline added] 
To prove non-disclosure, the BOD and Ms. Malby must prove by clear and convincing 
evidence that Dr. Peckham "failed to meet the objective, medical community-based standard of 
disclosure for informed consent as set forth in Sherwood: 
"A valid consent must be preceded by the physician disclosing those pertinent facts to the 
patient so that he or she is sufficiently aware of the need for, the nature of, and the 
significant risks ordinarily involved in the treatment to be provided in order that the 
giving or withholding of consent be a reasonably informed decision. The requisite 
pertinent Jacts to be disclosed to the patient are those which would be given by a like 
physician oj good standing practicing in the same community. " 
Shabinaw v. Brown, 131 Idaho 747, 751-52, 963 P.2d 1184, 1188-89, 1998 WL 553037 
(1998), quoting Sherwood, 119 Idaho at 256, 805 P .2d at 462 (emphasis added). 
On this finding, the Hearing Officer makes no reference to the testimony at hearing because 
there was no testimony to support his finding. There is no indication of a standard of dental care in 
the same community or similar communities anywhere in the Record. In fact, Dr. Mooney, though 
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practicing in Boise, not Post Falls, made clear that Dr. Peckham's conduct did meet the standard of 
dental care as far as he was concerned, that is the only testimony presented at hearing on this 
subject. The Hearing Officer's findings above and adopted by the Board of Dentistry are without 
foundation in the Record and constitute an arbitrary and capricious standard and violate Dr. 
Peckham's constitutional rights to due process. 
In a very similar matter, the Idaho Supreme Court reversed the Medical Board's discipline 
holding that it is incumbent upon the Board to support its findings as to community standard of 
care, with competent expert testimony. Laurino v. Board of Professional Discipline of the Idaho 
State Board of Medicine, 137 Idaho 596, 601-2, 51 P.3d 410, 415-6 (2002). 
"The burden of proof upon the Board in a disciplinary proceeding is the clear and 
convincing standard .... a determination of a violation of the standard of care must be supported by 
expert testimony, establishing the community's generally accepted standard of care required of a 
physician under the circumstances of each case under scrutiny." Laurino, 137 Idaho at 602. 
Otherwise, a Board finding that a medical professional has violated the standard of care 
where no standard of care has been articulated, defined, or codified to the specific circumstance, 
would constitute a standard so vague as to be constitutionally deficient and one which would 
deprive the medical professional of constitutional due process of law. See Krueger v. Board of 
Professional Discipline of the Idaho State Board of Medicine, 122 Idaho 577, 580, 836 P.2d 523, 
526 (1992). 
Furthermore, the disciplinary board "may not use its expertise as a substitute for evidence in 
the record, since the requirement for administrative decisions based on substantial evidence and 
recent findings - which provide the basis for effective judicial review - would become meaningless 
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if material facts known to or relied upon by the agency did not appear in the record." Laurino, 
supra at 601. 
Specifically, the Supreme Court in Laurino specifically reversed the Medical board's 
finding that Dr. Laurino violated the standard of care by not having a nurse witness the patient's 
signature on treatment consent forms, when no such standard of care was established by the 
evidence. Laurino, supra at 608. 
Idaho Code §39-4506 provides that informed consent for any medical or dental care is 
sufficient if the patient is "sufficiently aware of pertinent facts respecting the need for, the nature 
of, and the significant risks ordinarily attendant upon ... receiving such care, as to permit the giving 
or withholding of such consent to be a reasonably informed decision." I.C.§39-4506(201O) The 
standard is an objective one, not the subjective thoughts or intentions of the parties. 
The dentist or physician is required to provide that degree of information as would be given 
by a "like physician of good standing" practicing in that community. ML Shabinaw v. Brown, 131 
Idaho 747, 751, 963 P.2d 1184, 1188 (1998) 
In this matter, the Hearing Officer fashioned his own standard of care without any evidence 
presented by the BOD. The Hearing Officer's conclusion that Ms. Malby "believed" she was 
provided a silver crown not a silver amalgam crown and was not "specifically informed" that 
amalgam would be used is unsupported by the record. The Hearing Officer concluded that Dr. 
Peckham failed to meet the standard of care in the community while advising and securing 
informed consent from Ms. Malby. The Hearing Officer applied an arbitrary, capricious and 
subjective standard of care and violated Dr. Peckham's constitutional right to due process. 
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This Court should reverse the BOD's Final Order as violating Dr. Peckham's constitutional 
rights to due process and as unsupported by the Record. 
B. The Hearing Officer's finding that Dr. Peckham engaged in advertising which 
was false, misleading or deceptive to the public is unsupported by the Record 
and constitutes a violation of Dr. Peckham's due process and constitutional 
rights. 
Dr. Peckham maintained an educational portion of his professional website with certain 
public service information drawn from reputable, scientific studies and publications making a 
connection between poor dental health, missing teeth and the resultant need for dentures on the one 
hand, and serious physical ailments such as dementia, loss of bone density, jaw discomfort, poor 
nutrition, heart disease, diabetes, etc, on the other hand. Each of these ailments was determined by 
medical study to bear a statistical relationship or connection with persons with missing teeth, poor 
dental health and/or using dentures. The statements in Dr. Peckham's website are annotated to 
various reliable literature, scientific studies or other medical data, deemed to be credible within the 
medical and dental profession. As a result, no evidence was presented that the website was false or 
misleading. 
The Hearing Officer focused on two (2) "findings" from two (2) different portions of the 
website, which he determined to be misleading or that "might" deceive the public: (l) The 
distinction between missing teeth versus denture use the Hearing Officer concluded was not clearly 
stated; and (2) the statement that the State Dental Board does not think the general public can 
"handle the truth" was likewise misleading, as it may cause the public to conclude that Dr. 
Peckham's analysis is accurate and that the State Dental Board is seeking to stop Dr. Peckham from 
publishing this information. R. Vol. I, P. 272. 
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For the reasons set forth below, the Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
law are not supported by the Record and constitute an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority 
and violate Dr. Peckham's constitutional rights and due process. 
1. Missing Teeth v. Dentures 
On this point, the Hearing Officer appears to make a finding, which is a difference without 
distinction. He concludes that the literature relied upon by Dr. Peckham in his website statements 
makes a connection between tooth loss and various ailments, not denture use and various ailments. 
This finding is not substantiated since the Hearing officer chose to focus on a single article ("Nun 
Study") cited on the website, disregarding the numerous others. 
Unless the Hearing Officer findings were suggesting that a person with all their teeth would 
be a denture user, this is a distinction without a difference. Tr. Vol. I, Pp. 246-8. 
Despite this, the record makes clear that Dr. Peckham's website clearly demonstrates that 
he is relying upon published data that shows a link between dementia and missing teeth. 
The website admitted into evidence makes the following statements: 
• Missing teeth are associated with dementia 
• People with missing teeth live an average of ten years less 
than the rest of us. . .. 
• Long term denture use leads to bone loss and increased risk 
of jaw fracture. 
• Long term denture use may also lead to: 
• Increasing discomfort 
• Increasing chewing difficulty 
• Increasing TMJ ..... 
R. Vol. I, Pp. 193-4 
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Dr. Peckham goes on to make clear that is not exactly known or clear as to why these 
connections are true, but that common sense indicates that "premium dentures" should: 
• Feel natural 
• Look the way you want them to 
• Allow you to eat anything you want or need to eat 
• Preserve, not destroy, your jaw bone 
• Prevent, not cause, TMJ deterioration 
R. Vol. I, P.194 
Contrary to the Hearing Examiner's and Board of Dentistry's conclusion, there is no 
evidence in the record demonstrating these statements are, or were in fact, misleading or deceptive 
to any reader. It clearly indicates there is a connection between missing teeth and various physical 
ailments, which is a connection supported by medical literature. It also clearly states that long term 
denture use by those with no or few teeth, if the dentures are not well made, will increase 
discomfort, chewing difficulty and other related health problems that follow from someone who is 
missing teeth and using illjitting dentures. It is from this very clear, direct and well substantiated 
website that the Hearing Officer improperly substitutes his own standard and/or interpretation of the 
facts to conclude that this website was false, misleading or deceptive to the public.7 
Despite a complete lack of evidence to support this conclusion, the Hearing Officer 
concludes that these statements also mislead the public as to Dr. Peckham's skill or ability to "cure 
or limit" heart disease and diabetes through his dental care. R. Vol. I, P. 272 This appears to be the 
Hearing Officer's subjective standard of the "susceptible" public and a reintroduction of subsection 
f of Rule 46 which was stricken from the complaint and adjudged unconstitutional. 
7 It is worth noting that the Board of Dentistry did not present a single witness or piece of 
evidence to suggest that any member of the public was, in fact, misled, deceived or led to a false 
conclusion as to the statements found in Dr. Peckham's website, or as to his skill or ability. 
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Dr. Peckham's testimony and the website make it clear that this is intended as information 
to the public about the distinction between missing teeth or use of poorly fitting dentures versus 
dental care that involves premium dentures or implants, all with the intent of providing the patient 
better health. R. Vol. I, Pp 195-6 
Dr. Peckham even concludes the website by recommending that patients considering 
dentures seek out a "master dentist who makes premium dentures following" the criterion set forth 
in his website. 
It was unreasonably and unsubstantiated for the Hearing Officer to conclude that Dr. 
Peckham misrepresented his ability to "cure or limit heart disease and diabetes". R. VoL I, P. 272 
This Court should reverse the finding and conclusion as unsubstantiated by the record and 
evidencing an arbitrary, capricious and abuse of discretion. 
2. Dr. Peckham did not make any false or misleading statement on his 
website regarding the State Dental Board. 
The Hearing Officer further concluded that Dr. Peckham's website and the information 
contained in the statements "Can You Handle the Truth? The State Dental Board Doesn't Think 
You Can" was a false, misleading or deceptive statement by Dr. Peckham and intended by Dr. 
Peckham to mislead the public and recruit new patients. R. VoL I, P. 272. On this point, the 
Hearing Officer again ignored the evidence presented at hearing. 
This aspect of the proceedings dates back to a "cease and desist" letter sent by the Board of 
Dentistry's Executive Director on April 21, 2008. In it, the BOD director complains that Dr. 
Peckham's advertisements about the connections between missing teeth and disease may be false or 
misleading and deceptive to the pUblic. The Executive Director went on to state, "Further, such 
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representation is intended to take advantage of the fears and emotions of a particularly susceptible 
type of patient. This type of advertisement should cease immediately." R. Vol. I, Pp. 189-90 
Although Dr. Peckham responded to the Board of Dentistry's cease and desist directive by 
providing copies of the medical literature and asking the Board to define the "particularly 
susceptible type of patient", the cease and desist directive was not withdrawn by the Board of 
Dentistry, and this prosecution followed. It was not until Dr. Peckham filed a separate action, that 
the BOD finally conceded their rule, enforced in the April 21, 2008 letter, was unconstitutional, and 
then only on the verge of Hearings in this matter. 
As a result, Dr. Peckham testified that his warning language contained in the website that 
the Board of Dentistry does not think you can handle the truth was directly attributable to the Board 
of Dentistry cease and desist order of April 21, 2008. Dr. Peckham further testified that the 
warnings were tailored by him in an attempt to address the vague and ambiguous terminology of a 
"vulnerable individual" referenced in the letter and in Rule 46 (f). 
Dr. Peckham filed suit on the eve of these disciplinary proceedings in a District Court 
proceeding entitled "Lon N. Peckham, D.M.D. v. The Idaho State Board of Dentistry, Bonner 
County District Court Case No. CV-2010-01306. The Board of Dentistry, as Defendant, stipulated 
to the entry of a Judgment that I.D.A.P.A. 19.01.01.046.02(f) is an unconstitutionally vague and 
deficient rule violating Dr. Peckham's due process rights. Subsection (f) of the rule is the very 
portion of the rule which is quoted by the Board of Dentistry in its April 21, 2008, letter to Dr. 
Peckham ordering that Dr. Peckham cease and desist any such advertising. As a result, the 
statements by Dr. Peckham on his website in 2009 and 2010 that the Board of Dentistry does not 
think people can handle the truth, are a truthful reflection of the BOD's enforcement of an 
26 
unconstitutional rule. Dr. Peckham accurately stated on the website that the State Dental Board had 
directed him to cease and desist his advertising in 2008. Dr. Peckham accurately conveyed to the 
public that the communications in his website were truthful (based upon reliable literature) and that 
the State Board of Dentistry sought to curtail those statement (via a cease and desist letter dated 
April 21, 2008). There is nothing deceptive, misleading or false in any of those statements by Dr. 
Peckham, yet the Hearing Officer concluded that they were false, misleading or deceptive and that 
they "could reasonably be interpreted by the public to conclude that Dr. Peckham is attempting to 
communicate truth despite attempts by the State Board of Dentistry to curtail him." This is factual, 
not false or misleading. 
C. Dr. Peckham's websites are speech entitled to constitutional protection. 
Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker. But where a 
speaker exists, as is the case here, the protection afforded is to the 
communication, to its source and to its recipients both .... We 
acknowledged that this court has referred to a First Amendment 
right to "receive information and ideas" and that freedom of 
speech "necessarily protects the right to receive" ..... If there is a 
right to advertise, there is a reciprocal right to receive the 
advertising, and it may be asserted by these appellees. 
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, 425 U.S. 748,756-7,96 F.Ct. 1817, 1823,48 L.Ed.2d 
346, (1976)[holding that consumers had standing to assert First 
Amendment protections enjoyed by advertisers and that 
"commercial speech" was not wholly outside the protection of the 
First and Fourteen Amendments and, therefore, statutory bans on 
advertising prescription drug prices violated the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments] [citations omitted] 
While it is clear that Dr. Peckham's website, as it is directed to the State Dental Board, may 
offend the Respondent, our Idaho Supreme Court has made equally clear that words that are simply 
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offensive to some may not be banned, otherwise we violate free speech and the protections of the 
State and Federal Constitution. State v. Poe, 139 Idaho 885, 88 P.3d 704 (2003). 
The Court should set aside the Board of Dentistry's Final Order which merely reflects their 
offense that Dr. Peckham did not succumb to the cease and desist order in April, 2008, premised 
upon an unconstitutional Board rule. The BOD's sanctions of Appellant suppress free and truthful 
speech, instigated by the Board's adoption of an unconstitutional rule, Subsection (f). 
In short, the Board of Dentistry brought this upon themselves by adopting and enforcing a 
constitutionally deficient rule. For them to object now to Dr. Peckham's truthful statement in 
response to the "cease and desist" letter is simply an attempt to suppress free and truthful speech 
protected by the State ofldaho and U.S. Constitutions. 
This Court should reverse and remand with directions to vacate the Final Order of the Board 
of Dentistry as it pertains to Dr. Peckham's advertising. 
1. Dr. Peckham's statements on the website are not advertising. 
A prerequisite to the Board of Dentistry's prosecution of Dr. Peckham under Rule 46 found 
at I.D.A.P.A. 19.01.01.046 is a finding that the statements found on Dr. Peckham's website 
constitute advertisements. The rule defines advertisement as a "public communication about a 
licensee's professional services or qualifications for the purpose of soliciting business." LD.A.P.A. 
19.01.01.046.01 (a). 
Dr. Peckham testified at hearing that portions of his website are meant as advertising, (i.e., 
testimonials, etc.). But the evidence presented at hearing and Dr. Peckham's testimony clearly 
indicates that the denture report based upon health literature was intended by Dr. Peckham strictly 
as a public health information. This is borne out by Dr. Peckham's testimony as well as his 
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response to the BOD asking them to define subsection (f) so he could continue to disseminate 
public health information. 
The Hearing Examiner concluded that Dr. Peckham's website was intended to solicit or 
recruit new patients, but failed to support that finding by any evidence in the Record. The Denture 
Truth Report simply advises the public of the causal connection found in the medical literature 
between missing teeth and poor dentures with various physical ailments and suggests that 
individuals from the public consider premium dentures or implants in their treatment decision 
making. The website concludes by suggesting to the public that they seek out a master dentist or 
contact his office for a referral or free consultation. 
It is from this that the Hearing Officer makes the unsubstantiated conclusion that the 
statements were false, misleading and deceptive and could be reasonably interpreted by the public 
to conclude that Dr. Peckham is attempting to communicate truth while the Board of Dentistry 
attempts to curtail that information (all of which is factual) in an attempt to "recruit new patients 
and increase him implant practice". R. Vol. I, P. 272 
The conclusions found in the website are quite fair and even handed in suggesting to the 
public that either premium dentures or implants be utilized, and recommending that they seek 
advice from their own dentist, a master dentist, or seek a referral to such a master dentist. As a last 
alternative, Dr. Peckham offers a free consultation at his office. 
There is no evidence in the Record to support the Hearing Officer's finding that Dr. 
Peckham's website constitutes advertising as defined by Rule 46. This Court should reverse the 
BOD's Final Order and remand with appropriate instructions. 
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D. The Board of Dentistry's Final Order is deficient and must be overturned. 
The Board of Dentistry's Final Order as attached to the Petition for Judicial Review is as 
that Final Order was received, lacking any findings or conclusions. The same is true of the Agency 
Record on this appeal. R. Vol. I, Pp. 329-333. The Final Order states that the BOD is adopting the 
Hearing Officer's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommended Order and that said 
"Recommended Order" is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". No such Exhibit "A" or other attachment 
was included with the Final Order served upon Petitioner. 
An agency's order must contain a reasoned statement in support 
of the decision including a concise and explicit statement of the 
underlying facts of record supporting the findings. Findings of 
Fact must be based exclusively on the evidence in the record and 
on matters officially noticed in that proceeding ..... It is consistent 
with the Board's statutory obligation to render a reasoned decision 
to require the Board to identify facts as well as inferences drawn 
from the facts upon the application of its expertise and judgment 
which underlie its decision. 
Woodfield v. Board of Professional 
Discipline of Idaho State Board of Medicine, 
127 Idaho 738, 746-7, 905 P.2d 1047, 1055-6 (1995) 
In this case, the Board of Dentistry made no deliberation of the facts or evidence presented 
at hearing. It then issued a Final Order which references an Exhibit, which is not attached to the 
Final Order. 
This Court should reverse the Board of Dentistry's Final Order and remand with direction 
that the Board of Dentistry act in accordance with Idaho law and the Administrative Procedures 
Act, specifically. 
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E. The BOD's Final Order as to the Malby matter is improper as they rely upon 
the "expert" testimony from one of the BOD's Board Members, Dr. Blaisdell. 
"The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and disinterested tribunal. This 
requirement applies not only to courts, but also to state administrative agencies charged with 
applying eligibility criteria for licenses. Eacret v. Bonner County, 139 Idaho 780, 784, 86 P.3d 
494,498,2004 WL 385028 (2004), citing Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 100 S.Ct. 
1610,64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980). 
This guarantee of due process is violated by asking the BOD to weigh the "expert" 
testimony of one of its own members against that of a disinterested expert in the process of acting 
in a quasi-judicial capacity to determine if Dr. Peckham has violated certain standards. 
The Due Process Clause entitles a person to an impartial and 
disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases. This 
requirement of neutrality in adjudicative proceedings safeguards 
the two central concerns of procedural due process, the 
prevention of unjustified or mistaken deprivations and the 
promotion of participation and dialogue by affected individuals in 
the decision-making process. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 
259-262,266-267,98 S.Ct. 1042,1043,1050-1052, 1053, 1054, 
55 L.Ed.2d 252, (1978). The neutrality requirement helps to 
guarantee that life, liberty, or property will not be taken on the 
basis of an erroneous or distorted conception of the facts or the 
law. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 344, 96 S.Ct. 893, 
907,47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). At the same time, it preserves both 
the appearance and reality of fairness, "generating the feeling, so 
important to a popular government, that justice has been done," 
Joint Anti-Fascist Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 172, 71 
S.Ct. 624, 649, 95 L.Ed. 817 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring), 
by ensuring that no person will be deprived of his interests in the 
absence of a proceeding in which he may present his case with 
assurance that the arbiter is not predisposed to find against him ... 
Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238,242, 
100 S.Ct. 1610, 1613,64 L. Ed. 2d 182, (1980) 
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This Court should reverse the BOD's Final Order to the extent it relied upon biased 
testimony presented from its own member presented as an expert in the Malby matter. To do 
otherwise would violate Dr. Peckham's right to due process in these proceedings. 
F. Dr. Peckham is entitled to an award of attorney's fees and costs. 
Dr. Peckham requests an award of attorney's fees and costs on appeal under Idaho Code 
§ 12-117 as the BOD's Final Order and the proceedings in this matter reflect a failure to act upon 
a reasonable basis in fact or law. In regard to the Malby matter, the entire proceeding by the 
BOD has been prosecuted without the slightest of evidence presented to establish a dental 
standard of care for informed consent in the community. In fact, the BOD's own expert witness, 
Dr. Bates, a Spokane, Washington dentist testified that the Amalgam crown is used in his 
experience. Likewise, in the Advertising matter, the entire prosecution commenced with BOD's 
enforcement of a rule that Dr. Peckham was forced to file suit to challenge. In that matter, the 
BOD stipulated the rule was unconstitutional and they have now stricken it from their rules. 
"We believe the purpose of that statute is two-fold: (1) to serve as a deterrent to groundless or 
arbitrary agency action; and (2) to provide a remedy for persons who have borne unfair and 
unjustified financial burdens defending against groundless charges or attempting to correct 
mistakes agencies should never had made. Bogner v. State Dept. of Revenue & Taxation, State 
Tax Comm'n, 107 Idaho 854,859,693 P.2d 1056, 1061 (1984) 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in the trial record and asserted above, this Court is respectfully asked to 
reverse the Board of Dentistry's Final Order and remand with instructions to vacate the findings 
and conclusions entered against Dr. Peckham. Further, Dr. Peckham requests attorney's fees and 
costs be awarded. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of July, 2012. 
BY~~~~~-L~~~~~==~==~--__ __ 
BRENT C. FEATHERSTON 
Attorney for Appellants 
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